Abstract: This paper considers the extent to which the common law does or should protect fundamental human rights. It begins with reference to suggestions in various jurisdictions that there are some rights that are deeply rooted in common law, and which could not be interfered with by Parliament. It considers the position of common law rights in jurisdictions such as Australia with a written Constitution, and the extent to which rights are found in the common law or the Constitution or both, and the relation between the common law and the Constitution. It considers the possible theoretical underpinning of such suggestions, from a social contract, sovereignty and rule of law perspective. In so doing, it is acknowledged that, contrary to Diceyan theory, Parliaments do in fact act to take away fundamental rights, and it is argued to be simplistic to assume that the remedy for such behaviour is to be found at the ballot box, and never in the courts. Finally, arguments against the notion of rights protected by the common law are considered, including Parliamentary supremacy, arguments about democracy, and suggestions of 'judicial activism'.
I. Introduction
In recent years, we have seen substantial legislative incursion into the rights of individuals. This raises the issue of the extent to which, if at all, the common law and/or the Australian Constitution are or should be a brake on the ability of Parliament to curtail human rights. To what extent is a Parliament, subject to the Constitution, able to take away fundamental common law rights and liberties? The debate takes place in the context of the broader philosophical debate between natural law and legal positivism, and involves important questions of sovereignty and democracy. While the main focus of this paper is on the position in Australia, the paper draws upon, and is relevant to, perspectives on human rights in a range of jurisdictions.
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In Part II, jurisprudence from a range of jurisdictions is considered suggestive of the idea that the common law protects or is protective of rights against intrusion by Parliament. In Part III, it is considered whether, if such rights do exist, they exist at common law, pursuant to the Australian Constitution, or both, and whether this makes a difference. In doing so, the relationship between the common law and the Australian Constitution must be considered. In Part IV, it is argued that support exists for the proposition that the Constitution protects implied human rights, both textually and philosophically. The paper draws here on comments made by several members of the High Court in terms of a right to due process, Lockean theory of the social contract and the sovereignty of the people, and the rule of law.
In Part V, possible arguments against the idea that human rights should be implied from the Australian Constitution are considered, including the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, arguments about democracy, arguments that the founding fathers did not incorporate a bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, and questions of 'judicial activism'. Conclusions are drawn in Part VI. The paper does not consider the well-established practice of the court presuming that legislation was not intended to interfere with common law rights, or resolving any ambiguity in the interpretation of legislation in favour of the protection of common law rights and liberties.
II. Jurisprudence Suggesting that the Common Law Can be Used to Protect Rights from Parliamentary Intrusion
Of course, the orthodox Diceyan constitutional view has been that Parliament is able to enact any law it wishes, and it is not for a court to declare a law to be invalid. This doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy has been accepted, as we will see, for centuries in Great Britain, traditionally in absolute terms (though this is changing, as we will see), and also has general acceptance in Australian constitutional thought, subject to recognition of our constitutional arrangements and the existence of judicial review.
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Notwithstanding this, in a range of jurisdictions there has appeared a contrary suggestion, namely that the ability of Parliament to pass laws invasive of human rights might be limited by some common law constraints. 
i. Britain
The leading historical case supporting the proposition that there are some common law rights so fundamental that Parliament cannot And it appears in our books that in many cases the common law will controul [sic] acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an act of parliament is against common right or reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void. 4 Coke's views can be linked with those of Fortescue, who had earlier applied the theories of Aristotle and Aquinas in the English context, concluding that the common law was a divine and rational embodiment of the ius naturale. 5 Coke only partly identified the common law with natural law.
of its inconsistency with church law. 8 Perhaps unfortunately, this issue sometimes arose in the context of a conflict between a royal (common law) prerogative and a statute. The word 'unfortunate' is used because questions of the royal prerogative may have inadvertently got caught up with other general common law principles, in considering the impact of the Glorious Revolution on common law rights. Smallbone writes that
If Parliament was not, before the Bill of Rights, an absolute sovereign, there is nothing in the Bill of Rights which takes matters so far as to convert Parliament into a Hobbesian Leviathan. 9 Where sovereignty originally resided in the monarch, the monarch appointed a number of advisers to the Parliament, and the Parliament's role was to advise the monarch on a range of issues, including laws. There was a difference of opinion as to the authority of Parliament: on the one hand, royalists believed the monarch alone made statutes and the High Court of Parliament possessed sovereignty as the monarch's highest seat of judgment; on the other hand, parliamentarians believed statutes were made by the King and members of Parliament (Lords and Commons) as three partners sharing lawmaking functions. 10 These differences form part of the backdrop of the great conflicts between the monarch and Parliament that preceded the Glorious Revolution.
11 There is record, at least prior to the Glorious Revolution, of statutes being interpreted not to trample over 'sovereignty in 1688 was for practical purposes grasped by the nation . . . Thus perished, at the hands of an assembly animated by an authority which can hardly be otherwise regarded than as popular sovereignty in action, the idea of a sacred and inalienable governmental power, inherent in kings possessing a divine, indefeasible, hereditary title': The Constitutional History of Modern Britain (A&C Black: London, 1960) 270. Smallbone says the sovereignty grasped after 1688 was a political one rather than a legal one (267). 10 See Goldsworthy, above n. 8 at 63-75. 11 This includes the belief of James I that he was above the law, and the fatal clash between Charles I and the Parliament, leading to a lengthy proroguing of Parliament and a temporary republican form of government.
Crown prerogatives, at least where it would lead to absurdity. 12 The authority of the Crown was at that time paramount. 13 The authority of Dr Bonham's Case was confirmed in subsequent cases, both before 14 and after 15 the Glorious Revolution. Again reflecting natural law theory of this time (writing in 1765), Blackstone was adamant that:
Acts of Parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity, and if there arises out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. today understand it. 18 For example, in 1454 Chief Justice Fortescue stated that the High Court of Parliament was 'so high and so mighty in its nature' that questions concerning its privileges could not be decided by the judges. 19 St German insisted that a court could not judge a law to be void; this ability existed only in the High Court of Parliament. 20 Part of the thinking at this time was that Parliament could always be trusted to legislate for the common good, and that Parliament would not violate God's law. 21 In this we see the historical basis for Dicey's theory some centuries later.
We should also acknowledge during this period that judges did not enjoy the kind of judicial independence and security of tenure that we expect today. They could be dismissed by the King, and impeached by Parliament. 22 It is reported that six of the judges who decided the Ship Money case in favour of the King as opposed to the Parliament were subsequently impeached by Parliament. 23 In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that many judges were reluctant to assert their supremacy over the Parliament. As Goldsworthy notes of this time:
When Parliament asserted its authority in novel and controversial ways, for example, to destroy papal jurisdiction in the sixteenth century, and to control the prerogatives of the Crown in the seventeenth century, the judges were virtually compelled by political circumstances to acquiesce-although in the second case, only after many of them were impeached, and their decisions overturned by statute.
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Of course, Parliamentary supremacy became the dominant philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but recently there has been some resurgence of the idea that the common law limits the authority of Parliament. A leading scholar here is Allan, who argues that the rule of law must be given due prominence, such that laws 18 In conceding this, we should acknowledge some ambiguity, since Parliament in these historical times (i.e. prior to the Glorious Revolution) was not democratically elected, and was composed of appointees of the monarch. Further, 'Parliament' during these periods performed a greater role than the mere legislative, apparently exercising a range of powers including legislative, judicial and executive powers. This makes it more difficult to state categorically that a legislative body had been recognized as the supreme law-making body, when it might in the alternative be argued that it was a judicial body that had been recognized as the supreme law-making body. This is why Parliament at that time was referred to as the 'High Court of Parliament'. Much more of this interesting history is found in, for example, Goldsworthy, above n. 10 at chs 3-7. offending principles of equality should be struck down. 25 Allan concludes that:
The limits on the power of a democratic majority to achieve its legislative will are ultimately to be found in the common law; and the common law is too subtle to tolerate the absurdity-even constitutional contradiction-of wholly unlimited legislative power.
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Most recently Lord Steyn of the House of Lords has stated, in dicta, that:
We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled constitution as the Attorney General implausibly asserts . . . The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom.
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In the same case, Lord Hope claimed (again in dicta) that:
Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. It is not uncontrolled in the sense referred to by Lord Birkenhead LC in McCawley v King [1920] AC 691, 720. It is no longer right to say that its freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever.
Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified. For the most part these qualifications are themselves the product of measures enacted by Parliament.
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Lord Hope referred with apparent approval to the extra-judicial comments of Sir Owen Dixon about the 'supremacy throughout the constitution of ordinary law'.
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In Britain then, there has long been disagreement between the view that the law-making body is subject to some fundamental common law liberties and the ideology of legal positivism that has been pervasive in more recent times.
ii. America
The arguments of Coke and others were used by those in the American colonies resisting the Stamp Acts legislation, to assert that the legislation was contrary to the Magna Carta and natural rights, and so should not be followed. These arguments were used to seek to The defendant argued that the law was contrary to the Magna Carta and sought to take away the fundamental right to trial by jury. Lord Coke was cited in support of these arguments. The Act was apparently held to be unconstitutional and void. 31 A stronger precedent is Bowman v Middleton where the court clearly expressed its decision to invalidate an Act of Parliament clarifying the boundary between two properties on the basis that it was 'against common right and Magna Carta . . . the act was therefore ipso facto void'. 32 The Supreme Court of the United States has also resorted to this reasoning to set aside legislation, quite independently of any express provisions in the Bill of Rights.
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Of course, one of the reasons for the growing independence movement in the United States in the 1760s and 1770s was the dissatisfaction with taxation of the colonies by the British, in particular the Sugar Act, Stamp Act and Townshend Duties of 1767. Part of the argument against these laws was that they involved 'taxation without representation', or in other words taxation levied by a Parliament not answerable to those required to pay the taxes. It was argued that this made the taxes illegal and invalid. Underpinning such arguments is the notion that some statutes passed by Parliament are not valid, and that it is proper for a court to declare them to be contrary to fundamental law and ineffective for that reason.
A leading writer at the time, Otis, condemned taxation without representation as violative of 'the law of God and nature' and the 'common law' that no person, not excepting Parliament, could take away. 34 John Dickinson wrote of rights that 'are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken away from us by any human power'. The Continental Congress in 1774 declared that Americans had the right 'by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts . . . to life, liberty and property which no one had a right to dispose of without their consent'. 35 Various colonial constitutions written prior to 1776 were also premised on the fact that common law rights existed prior to, and were higher than, legislative authority. The purpose of an express bill of rights was merely to document such rights, not to introduce new rights, but to confirm what was already there.
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The Lockean-influenced United States Declaration of Independence reflects similar sentiments:
All men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable [emphasis added] Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
Two of the specific grievances noted by the authors include the attempts of the English to deny the right to trial by jury to many citizens of the American colonies, and other attempts to take away 'our Charters'.
There are clear links between these assertions and the acceptance of judicial review by the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison, 37 and clear links between the insistence on these common law rights and the eventual adoption in that nation of a bill of rights, obviating at least to some extent the need to argue on the basis of the common law. The link is shown pre-independence days in the Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey which began with a provision that: the common law or fundamental rights of the colony should be the foundation of government, which is not to be altered by the legislative authority.
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It is shown in post-independence days by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, planning for the evolution of territories to statehood. It is said to be the first federal document to contain a bill of rights. 39 The document states that in order to extend 'the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty', Congress included articles that were to remain 35 'forever unalterable', guaranteeing to citizens rights such as habeas corpus, trial by jury, representative government, judicial proceedings 'according to the course of the common law'. As Levy concludes:
The American colonial experience, climaxed by the controversy with England leading to the Revolution, honed American sensitivity to the need for written constitutions that protected rights grounded in the 'immutable laws of nature' as well as in the British constitution and colonial charters. 40 However, importantly in the Australian context, the common law rights were recognized prior to, and independently of, any express bills of rights. 41 Those who argued against the express bill of rights in America used the argument that there was no need because the government could not encroach on 'reserved' rights. 42 A related argument was that if some express rights were conferred, other rights might not be respected. In order to meet such objections, the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly recognizes that although some express rights are found in the Constitution, this does not deny or disparage others retained by the people.
iii. Australia
This issue was canvassed by the High Court of Australia in Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King. 43 In rejecting the suggestion that the words 'peace, welfare and good government' were words of limitation, 44 the court nevertheless canvassed other possibilities:
Whether the exercise of . . . legislative power is subject to some restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic system and the common law, a view which Lord Reid firmly rejected in In a series of decisions, Murphy J suggested several rights were implied by the Australian Constitution, 47 including freedom of speech, assembly, communication and travel throughout the Commonwealth, freedom from slavery, serfdom, civil conscription, cruel and unusual punishment, arbitrary discrimination on the grounds of sex, and selfdetermination. 48 These rights were said to be inherent in a free and democratic society. 49 Deane and Toohey JJ are on record as having decided that federal (and possibly state) legislative power was subject to fundamental principles of the common law; 50 specifically in Leeth these judges recognized a common law doctrine of the underlying equality of all persons under the law and before the courts. This was drawn from the agreement of the people to unite in a Commonwealth. 51 Gaudron J agreed with the result but justified it on the basis of an inherent requirement of the exercise of federal judicial power, 52 and Brennan J agreed that the doctrine was an implied limitation on Commonwealth legislative power. 53 Toohey expanded on his views extra-judicially. In suggesting that the High Court could as 'guardian of a written constitution within the context of a liberal democratic society' imply limits on government power:
It might be thought that, in construing a constitution, to deny plenary scope to heads of power where a wide reading would afford capacity to infringe fundamental liberties is an analogous approach to that which is well settled in relation to the construction of statutes . . . Where the people of Australia, in adopting a constitution, conferred power to legislate with respect to various subject matters upon a Commonwealth Parliament, it is to be presumed that they did not intend that those grants of power extend to invasion of fundamental common law 47 The principles of the common law with respect to the interpretation and operation of a statute may be supposed to account in great measure for the form and method of modern legislation. The form and the method that are established imply real limitations. A rhetorical question may be enough to make this clear. Would it be within the capacity of a parliamentary draftsman to frame, for example, a provision replacing a deeprooted legal doctrine with a new one? 55 It seems clear that Dixon's answer to this question would have been 'no'. Dixon spoke of the common law as a jurisprudence 'antecedently existing into which our system came and in which it operates'. 56 He believed that the common law was the source of the authority of the British Parliament, 57 and as a result that constitutional questions had to be resolved in the context of the whole law, including the common law. 58 His thoughts are expressed further in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth where in discussing Australia's constitutional arrangements, he said that:
It is government under the Constitution and that is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as for example, in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption. Implicit and not analysed, but basic-of common law as the ultimate foundation of British colonial institutions, a belief that not even Parliament could properly deprive British subjects anywhere of their birthright.
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It is submitted that these views would mean that a statute invasive of human rights might be declared invalid because of its inconsistency with the common law. The reasoning would be that Parliaments derive their authority to pass legislation from the Commonwealth Constitution. If the Commonwealth Constitution was subject to the common law as its 'foundation', then it would follow that legislation incompatible with the common law would be invalid for that reason. In other words, though he did not expressly make the link, it might be said that Dixon's views were consistent with the pure theory of law philosophy of Hans Kelsen, who spoke of laws as a series of norms, deriving their authority from higher norms. At the top of these series of norms stood the 'grundnorm', the basic norm from which all norms within the system derived their validity. 61 Dixon was saying that the common law was the grundnorm, against which the validity of all other norms was to be tested.
iv. New Zealand
Sir Robin Cooke, former President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, argued in a series of cases 62 that some common law rights 'presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override them'. He included on the list freedom from torture, the right of access to the courts, natural justice, and a prohibition on abdication of power. Writing extra-judicially, he added:
The modern common law should be seen to have a free and democratic society as its basic tenet and, for that reason, to be built on two complementary and lawfully unalterable principles: the operation of a democratic legislature and the operation of independent courts . . . The approval to comments by the author of Maxwell on Statutes, 4th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1962) 121 to the effect that 'it is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used'. 64 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the common law of unwritten privileges of regional Houses of Assembly formed part of the supreme and entrenched fundamental law of Canada, and could not be disturbed by legislation. 65 It is clear then that, despite the prevalence of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, there have been suggestions over many years and across a range of jurisdictions to the effect that the common law could be utilized to limit the extent to which Parliament could pass laws invasive of human rights.
III. The Relationship Between the Common Law and the Constitution
We must consider whether human rights are protected by the common law, or, in countries such as Australia with a written Constitution, that document, or some combination of the two. In turn, this raises questions of the relationship between the common law and the Constitution, to which I now turn. Which is superior? Which informs the other? As indicated, the view of Sir Owen Dixon was that the common law was the grundnorm:
Federalism means a rigid constitution and a rigid constitution means a written instrument. It is easy to treat the written instrument as the paramount consideration, unmindful of the part played by the general law, notwithstanding that it is the source of the legal conceptions that govern us in determining the effect of the written instrument. Suggestions that the common law forms the background to, and controls the meaning of, the Constitution also appear in several cases and extra-judicial comments by judges. For example, a unanimous High Court in Cheatle stated:
It is well settled that the interpretation of a Constitution such as ours is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of the common law's history.
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In other cases, the High Court has found that the rules of the common law must yield to constitutional requirements. We saw this in cases such as Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd, 68 where the court modified the common law of defamation in light of an implied freedom of political speech. 69 In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the High Court again claimed that the Constitution overruled any inconsistent rules of the common law, including the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. 70 In Commonwealth v Mewett, it was established that common law Crown immunities had been effectively abolished by a provision of the Constitution. 71 In If it is true that the Constitution affects the common law, as the High Court has held, it is submitted that it may not matter whether such rights are grounded in the common law or the Constitution. Their content is the same, and their effect on legislation inconsistent with such rights would be the same. An argument that the rights are implicit in the Constitution would be more appealing to those who require some written text from which rights are said to flow, rather than 'the common law' which is for some too amorphous. 74 It may be that concerns about the legitimacy in a democracy of common law rights enforced by non-elected judges (which I will discuss later in the paper) can also be addressed more easily in a context whereby rights are seen to be implicit in the Constitution which members of the High Court are charged with interpreting, rather than (merely) based on common law.
As a result, it is argued that some fundamental rights (which will be articulated later) are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The common law is useful as providing, in some cases, several hundred years of jurisprudence upon which we can draw to elaborate and understand these rights more fully.
IV. Support for the Implication of Rights in the Constitution

i. The Text
While Dixon J famously concluded that we should not be fearful of making implications from the text of the Constitution, 75 it has taken some time for the High Court to develop the suggestion of implications in the text of the Constitution in the area of rights, and great controversy has arisen when, in particular, the Mason Court adopted this line of reasoning. against the states or subjecting them to special burdens or disabilities, 77 and during the 1990s the High Court recognized the implied freedom of political communication. 78 Recently, the High Court found that voting rights were implicitly protected by the structure of the Constitution.
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Certainly High Court sentiments regarding the separation of powers as a protector of rights find express textual support in the Constitution. 80 In Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, three members of the Court agreed that the Constitution required that judicial power could not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the essential character of a court, or the nature of judicial power. 81 Judges have expressly linked the separation of powers doctrine to the concept of due process, 82 including the right to a fair trial. 83 Links to the rule of law have also been noted, 84 as well as notions of equality.
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There is support for the suggestion that the right to a fair trial would include important criminal rights such as the presumption of innocence and right to silence, 86 both of which have been described by the High Court as fundamental to our system of criminal justice. 87 Due process has been given an extended meaning in the United States jurisprudence.
88 Justice Brandeis linked separation of power with the requirements of a democracy thus:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 89 There is evidence that Coke himself believed that the Magna Carta required due process of law.
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Thus the High Court has been prepared to make implications from the text of the Constitution, and several members of the Court have suggested that the Constitution might require due process and/or a right to a fair trial. These rights are of ancient origin and have been recognized in other jurisdictions. Due process then might include:
The right to trial by jury for serious offences, the right to unanimous jury verdict, the right to due process/procedural fairness (including natural justice), right to legal representation in criminal matters, right 86 See Wheeler, above n. 80 at 272: 'it should be accepted that where Parliament has placed upon the defendant the persuasive burden of proof in relation to an element of a federal offence, this is (prima facie) to ask a court exercising federal jurisdiction to conduct an unfair criminal trial because of the risk that under such circumstances a defendant will be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt'. to presumption of innocence, right to silence, the right to vote, right to judicial review, freedom from arbitrary punishment, incarceration in prison only for past breach of the criminal law.
It will be seen that many of these rights can be deduced from the right to due process/right to a fair trial which some members of the High Court have been prepared to recognize. This can be drawn from the separation of powers the Constitution clearly expressly contemplates. Other possible implied rights include the right to freedom of thought/ conscience/religion, considered implicit in the representative democracy contemplated by the Constitution. Of course, many of these rights find written expression in human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 91 Though the use of international materials to interpret the Constitution or the common law is of course contentious, at least some members of the High Court have used international materials as evidence of the common law 92 or to guide constitutional questions. 93 This theory does mean the judges would have a role to play in giving precise meaning to these rights, and reviewing legislation to see whether it is consistent with these stated rights. It is suggested that, as with rights expressed in legal documents, the rights not be considered absolute, and that some kind of 'reasonable regulation' exception would operate, much as it does in respect of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech in the United States. The judges would modify and adapt the precise content of these rights over time as society developed and changed, just as the common law has always adapted.
ii. Philosophical Support (a) Links with Social Contract Theory and Sovereignty
Leading advocates of social contract theory had views on the extent to which rights of an individual were subsumed by the 'contract' they entered into with others to form a civilized society. 94 Locke, for example, states clearly that there are limits of the authority of the body delegated to make laws. 95 He claims that their powers are limited by natural rights, 96 he believed that an individual only entered into the social contract in order to preserve their liberties. 97 Locke believed that the purpose of government was to ensure the 'mutual preservation of human lives, liberties and estates, and more generally decries the idea that the legislators have absolute power. 98 As Allan says, 'in political theory, the legislative power derives from the consent of the people and is to be understood as a trust for their benefit'. Where the people of Australia, in adopting a constitution, conferred power to legislate with respect to various subject matters upon a Commonwealth Parliament, it is to be presumed that they did not intend that those grants of power extend to invasion of fundamental common law liberties.
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Similar views had in a different era been expressed by Murphy J, 106 and by Inglis Clark back in 1901. 107 The implication of the suggestion that sovereignty lies in the people is that Parliament does not have the power to infringe common law rights and liberties of the sovereign body.
108 It would also reduce the importance of the intentions of the founding fathers in relation to the protection of rights. 109 Allan relates Lockean theory with the rule of law:
The rule of law constitutes an ideal of consent, wherein the law seeks the citizen's acceptance of its demands as morally justified: he is invited to acknowledge that obedience is the appropriate response in the light of his obligation to further the legitimate needs of the common good . . . If the law aspires to an order of governance that all can freely accept, as a necessary framework for the co-operation of autonomous and morally conscientious citizens, there are certain basic freedoms and other institutional arrangements whose constitutional status must be placed beyond serious constitutional challenge . . . If the rule of law attributes responsibility for the identification of 'valid' law . . . to the conscience of the individual citizen, acting on his understanding of the needs of the common good, purported 'laws' or policies that are gravely unjust . . . lack both legal and moral authority. that the founding fathers were not the source of legitimacy of the Constitution, rather living Australian citizens were. 110 Allan, above n. 25 at 6-7.
(b) The Rule of Law and Rights
Dicey's counterbalance to the absolutism involved in his doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy was the rule of law. He took the rule of law to imply that no person could be punished except for a distinct breach of law established in ordinary manner before the courts (i.e. no arbitrary exercise of power), that all were equal before the law, and that civil liberties were the result of past case law rather than formal constitutional recognition.
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At one point he seemed to have a broad view of the consequences of the rule of law-stating that freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to express opinions, and the right to property were all part of the 'law of the land'. He then said:
[W]here . . . the right to individual freedom is part of the constitution because it is inherent in the ordinary law of the land, the right is one which can hardly be destroyed without a thorough revolution in the institutions and manners of the nation . . . the constitution being based on the rule of law, the suspension of the constitution, as far as such a thing can be conceived possible, would mean with us nothing less than a revolution. 112 However, in the end he re-asserts the dominance of Parliamentary supremacy.
Others have pointed out what they see as the conflict between the absolutism involved in Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law.
113 Wait sees it thus:
The limits supplied by the common law in the Communist Party Case were analogous to the notions of natural law so famously drawn upon by Sir Edward Coke. Dixon's commitment to fundamental common law principles demonstrated a re-alignment of Dicey's two pre-eminent 111 Dicey, above n. 22 at 183-91. 112 Ibid. at 196-7. On the same page he contrasted systems where the right to individual freedom is a result deduced from the principles of the Constitution; the right could be readily taken away or suspended. However, in England, because the right to individual freedom was part of the Constitution as being inherent in the law of the land, the right was one that could not be destroyed without a revolution. However, with respect he then contradicts himself (in my view) because he acknowledges that the English Habeas Corpus Act could be suspended and the English would enjoy 'almost all the rights of citizens'. He had on the same page said that the rights of English people could not be destroyed without a revolution, and contrasted England with other countries where constitutional rights could be suspended. He concedes that Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law might appear to be contradictory-his way of reconciling them was in effect to assert the superiority of Parliamentary supremacy, but acknowledge the role of courts in interpreting such legislation consistently with the rule of law (409). In practice, this reconciliation might occur, for example, by courts presuming that statutes do not undermine common law rights, or, where there is ambiguity, reading the Act narrowly to minimize its impact on fundamental rights. constitutional principles, installing the rule of law over the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
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Both Sir Owen Dixon and Victor Windeyer have in extra-judicial writing confirmed that the rule of law forms part of the common law which underlies Australia's constitutional arrangements and which informs our understanding of the Constitution in Australia. 115 The International Commission of Jurists and the Chicago Colloquium on the Rule of Law have argued that the rule of law requires legislative power to be subject to certain limits, whether by constitutional limit or by custom. 116 An important aspect of the rule of law is that individuals are expected to know in advance what the nature of official encroachment on their liberties is to be before that power is exercised against the individual.
117 It may be argued that the Australian people were not informed in the lead up to the referendum to adopt the Constitution that the new Commonwealth Parliament, or the new state Parliaments that owe their existence to the Constitution, would have the right to alter fundamental rights and liberties that they enjoyed at that time, including the right to trial by jury and other rights in relation to criminal matters. They did not consent to such rights being taken away, and they assumed that the rights they enjoyed as citizens up until that time would continue to be enjoyed post-federation. They had no reason to think otherwise.
As a result, the principle of the rule of law could be used to justify limits on the ability of Parliament to pass legislation interfering with fundamental common law rights and liberties. Aristotle remarked that a characteristic of humans was that they shared a sense of the just and the unjust, and that their sharing of a common understanding of justice made a polis. 118 In discussing these comments, Rawls adds that a 'common understanding of justice as fairness makes a constitutional democracy'. 119 He adds that:
We are not required to acquiesce in the denial of our own and others' basic liberties, since this requirement could not have been within the meaning of the duty of justice in the original position, nor consistent with the understanding of the rights of the majority in the constitutional convention 120 . . . a just constitution is defined as a constitution that would be agreed upon by rational delegates in a constitutional convention who are guided by the [principle] that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a system of liberty for all.
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There is no evidence the author has read to suggest that the founding fathers were aware that, or intended that, these Parliaments would (or had the right to) take away fundamental common law liberties. It was not, as I have indicated earlier, their experience that colonial Parliaments had interfered with common law liberties and freedoms, and they could not have anticipated that this would occur. 122 Another way in which the rule of law may be relevant here is to see the concept as a counterbalance of Dicey's other doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. In other words, Parliamentary supremacy does not allow infringements of the rule of law. Allan, for example, discusses different conceptions of the rule of law, including formal equality, or the sense that legal rules are applied strictly to everyone according to their tenor, and substantive equality. In favouring substantive equality, Allan was able to suggest that the rule of law requires equality of treatment of individuals, or due process, 123 to be followed. He concluded that the rule of law was to be preserved by construing statutes consistently with fundamental principles of justice embedded in the common law, 124 and he singled out freedom of thought, speech, conscience and association as examples of nonnegotiable constituents of an enduring common good. 125 Rawls agreed that the rule of law required due process.
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This view obtains support from some members of the judiciary, for example Lord Woolf MR, who found that 'ultimately there are even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts' inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold . . . They are no more than are necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved', 127 and recent Of course, much will depend on how the rule of law is defined, and if all that is meant is that legislative power is subject to constitutional limit, as the International Commission suggests, there is no difficulty and it supports the idea of restraint of the absolutism otherwise implied by Parliamentary supremacy.
However, is what is meant by the rule of law that there be 'equality' as Allan suggests? Is that concept the needed brake on the ability of Parliament to pass legislation? For example, take a law that abolishes jury trials for all of those accused of crimes. Now, this law would apply equally to all accused. Would this pass Allan's 'equality' test and so not infringe the rule of law? What of a law that reversed the presumption of innocence, or abolished the right to silence in all criminal trials? Again, these laws on their face and in effect would apply in a non-discriminatory way, so it may be that they would pass the 'equality' test and so not be struck out by the rule of law. However, to the author such laws would be repugnant to fundamental common law rights. To the extent that the 'equality' test would validate such laws, the author does not find the test convincing.
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The conception of the rule of law discussed earlier in this part is preferred, that all individuals must know in advance the nature of the encroachment on their liberties, and that the Australian people in the lead up to the adoption of the Constitution were not advised, and did not expect, that the powers of the new Commonwealth governments 128 [2006] 1 AC 262. 129 Ibid. at 302: 'We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled constitution as the Attorney-General implausibly asserts . . . The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.' 130 Ibid. at 303-4: 'Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute . . .
Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.' 131 I would agree with the observation of Rawls then that 'treating similar cases similarly is not a sufficient guarantee of substantive justice': Rawls, above n. 119 at 59.
and state governments would extend to the extinguishment of fundamental common law rights.
iii. Governments do Take Away Fundamental Rights and Liberties
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
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At the heart of Diceyan theory is the notion that the remedy for government law invading fundamental human rights is political only, rather than legal. The courts are apparently impotent in the face of repugnant laws. Dicey used the well-known example of the blue-eyed baby to demonstrate his absolutist position:
If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and the subjects be idiotic before they could submit to it.
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While there is some abstract logic in Dicey's model in terms of selfpreservation, 134 the reality must be accepted that governments do, and have, legislated to take away fundamental common law liberties. Dixon J in the Communist Party Case recognized this:
History . . . shows that in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive power. 135 The right to trial by jury has been greatly restricted; the right to silence has in some cases been curtailed. The right of accused to cross-examine witnesses testifying against them has been limited in some cases. 136 Legislation has been passed providing for systems of preventive detention; 137 control orders have been introduced in the terrorist context; 138 legislation providing for indefinite detention based only on Ministerial direction has been validated. 139 Laws have been passed to greatly restrict the right of refugees to claim judicial review in relation to their refugee applications. 140 It was sought to introduce legislation to ban a political party in Australia, infringing the fundamental right of freedom of association. 141 When that legislation was struck down, the government sought to introduce a referendum to give it the power to directly deal with the Communist Party.
Though the referendum was defeated, the government who had introduced the original legislation, and who subsequently pressed the issue at a referendum, was not removed from office by the people when given an opportunity. The attempted invasion of human rights was not 'remedied' by the political process, as Dicey would have believed. Of course, the truth is far more complex-people make their decision as to their government based on a range of factors. Anecdotally, it is suggested that the human rights record of a government would be well down the list of factors influencing election outcomes, and there is evidence that governments which pass laws invasive of human rights actually enjoy a payoff at the polls.
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This is not to argue the relative merits of any or all of the above policy decisions. It is to affirm that history is replete with examples where governments have sought to take away fundamental civil liberties. There is an inherent tension between the exercise of legislative power and the preservation of civil liberties, to make it incoherent to expect the holders of the former to always respect the latter.
One can make the same point in reverse-that there are numerous examples where it has been the courts, rather than Parliaments, that have remedied what we now consider to be gross breaches of human rights. It was the High Court of Australia, rather than the Parliament, that took the first steps to the recognition of indigenous land rights in this country. 143 It was the United States Supreme Court that took the decision that eventually ended government policies favouring segregation based on race.
144 It was that court that set out minimum requirements for the questioning of suspects.
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Of course, this isn't meant to imply that the common law is perfect. Justice Gummow has commented that it would be unwise to 'carry into constitutional discourse an undue romanticism about the common law'.
146 So much may be agreed. However, the above examples show that any romanticism about the role of Parliament in preserving fundamental civil liberties is also misplaced.
V. Counter-Arguments i. Parliamentary Supremacy
It is sometimes said that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 heralded an acceptance of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, in other words, that Parliament could make or unmake any law, and it was not for a court to declare laws to be invalid. 147 The view would be that Coke's doctrines could not have survived this development, despite what Blackstone wrote above post-Revolution. An absolutist version of Parliamentary supremacy would logically not support the implication of rights from the text of the Constitution and/or the common law, since this would have the effect of reducing the power of Parliament to pass laws it deems fit.
However, others have since challenged the view that the events of 1688 established Parliamentary supremacy. 148 Marshall, for example, argued that the Revolution simply meant Parliament was supreme relative to other organs of government, rather than that it was omnicompetent; 149 Allott claimed Dicey's views flew in the face of 1000 years of talk of 'fundamental law' by kings and others; 150 and de Walker claimed conflict between the Diceyan theory of Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law. 151 Fitzgerald spoke of the 'ignorant trust' Dicey reposed in the Parliament. 152 The doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy may be simply a common law rule, subject to change like every other principle of common law. 153 A provision of the (English) Bill of Rights might also deny the plausibility of Parliamentary supremacy-after enumerating various rights, Article VI of the Bill states that:
All and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration, are the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and that all . . . shall be firmly and strictly holden and observed. 154 Despite the dominance of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy in England, there are clear examples, for example in the context of the recognition of foreign law, where the courts have recognized limits. For example, the House of Lords refers to a foreign law as involving 'so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all'. 155 This leaves open the question of the attitude of the court if the law were instead a local one. In the case of a British statute which declared that the findings of a Commission were not to be called into question in any court of law, the British court ignored the provision. Lord Reid, for example, said that he 'expected to find something more specific than the bald statement that the determination shall not be called into question in any court of law'. 156 The notion of Parliamentary supremacy does and has changed, in light of the evolution of the European Union.
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The notion of Parliamentary supremacy is more difficult in a country such as Australia that accepts judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, and the ability of a court to strike down legislation inconsistent with the Constitution. 158 The notion may be at odds with a federal state, 159 and Dicey himself would not have found the Australian Parliament to be a sovereign law-making body, according to his criteria. 160 Speaking of the United States Supreme Court, but in terms equally applicable to the High Court of Australia, Dicey observed that:
Sovereignty is lodged in a body which rarely exerts its authority and has (so to speak) only a potential existence; no legislature throughout the land is more than a subordinate law-making body capable in strictness of enacting nothing but by-laws; the powers of the executive are again limited by the constitution; the interpreters of the constitution are the judges. The Bench therefore can and must determine the limits to the authority both of the government and of the legislature; its decision is without appeal; the consequence follows that the Bench of judges is not only the guardian but also at a given moment the master of the Constitution. 161 Sir Owen Dixon said it was not a doctrine of general application to all legislatures, and its effect was confined to the United Kingdom Parliament. 162 It may be that, as Allan has advocated, the doctrine should not be seen in isolation but associated with the rule of law, and not superior to it. Legislation inconsistent with the rule of law (as defined) is not valid, despite Parliamentary supremacy. He said:
The fundamental constraints of equality and due process are wrongly viewed as limitations on popular sovereignty. That is a false antithesis, which lends spurious plausibility to the notion of conflicting imperatives of 'popular sovereignty' and 'judicial activism'. The critical question is how the idea of popular sovereignty should be understood: in what sense is the constitution owned or fashioned by the people, and what is the basis of their loyalty to its commands? Democracy is an aspiration to self-government that is erroneously equated with majority rule; and the corresponding idea of popular sovereignty should be understood to embody the claim of every citizen to equal respect. A majority decision to remove the legal foundations of the dignity and independence of a single citizen, in violation of the principles of the rule of law, is not to be understood as an exercise of popular sovereignty, however great the majority or passionate its specious claim of legitimacy. Citizenship in a liberal democratic regime cannot be equated merely with liberty to vote, on the one hand, and subjection to whatever treatment a majority vote endorses, on the other. 166 It was discussed in the section prior to this one that despite the faith that Diceyan Parliamentary supremacy places in the political process, there are numerous examples where Parliaments have acted to seriously erode rights. The remedy in respect of such laws is not always or often in fact at the ballot box.
For these reasons, it must be questioned whether it is correct any more to apply notions of Parliamentary supremacy to the constitutional arrangements of Australia. It has powerful detractors, most prominently a unanimous High Court in Lange. As a result, notions of Parliamentary supremacy should not be used to argue against the implication of rights in the Constitution.
ii. Arguments About Democracy
Judicial review of the validity of legislation is not an essential prerequisite for the protection of human rights and democracy in every legal system committed to those ideals. 167 It is often argued by advocates of Parliamentary supremacy that the alternative, which would give judges a role in reviewing legislation and invalidating statutes which impinged on fundamental legal rights, is anti-democratic. Typically, Ekins states that:
The obvious, and to my mind irrefutable, objection to judicial supremacy is that elected legislators have a far greater democratic mandate than unelected judges to make the political choices that determine the content of the law, especially in respect of morally controversial issues . . . it is implausible to assert that judges will necessarily make morally sound decisions. 168 However, with respect it may be mistaken to equate 'democracy' with majoritarian will, as the above quote implies. 169 Sir Anthony Mason concluded that 'our evolving concept of the democratic process is moving beyond an exclusive emphasis on parliamentary supremacy and majority will . . . embracing a notion of responsible government which respects the fundamental rights and dignity of the individual'. Court ' (1990) 28 Alberta Law Review 324 at 337. It seems Plato and Aristotle also had a more sophisticated sense of democracy-'societies in which the winners of the competition for office reserve the conduct of public affairs wholly to themselves are no constitutional states, just as enactments, so far as they are not for the common interest of the whole community, are no true laws' (Laws IV: 715b) (Plato), and Aristotle: 'it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a rule-of-the-many is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution . . . an organisation of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense' (Politics III, 4:1279a17-22; 5:1280b7-9; IV, 4:1292a31-4). Citing these passages, Finnis argues that these writers believed that unjust laws were not laws: Finnis, above n. 96 at 363 (despite having been passed by a 'Parliament'). 170 'Future Directions in Australian Law ' (1987) idea of citizenship in a free society . . . will properly place them beyond serious legislative encroachment'. 171 It is an error to argue that a society is not democratic unless it has a government of unlimited powers. 172 Further, while Ekins may be right that there is no guarantee that judges will necessarily make morally sound decisions, it is suggested that legislators are likely to feel more pressure to encroach on fundamental civil liberties than are judges. 173 Parliamentarians are under pressure to react to some perceived wrong or injustice. They are influenced by lobby groups to act in particular ways that may not respect fundamental human rights. 174 The ability of a legislator to impinge on fundamental civil liberties, through the passage of legislation that applies to every member of society, is far greater than the ability of a judge to impinge on fundamental liberties. Even the frail shield of accountability to the people fails when those affected are in a minority or for some other reason are not represented in the legislature. 175 So while I agree that neither judges nor legislators have all of the 'morally sound' cards, it is submitted that the likelihood of an attack on civil liberties is much more likely to come from the legislator rather than the judge, and so it is justified to give judges the power to strike down legislation invasive of human rights.
As mentioned earlier, it may assist in meeting the democracy concern to recognize that the rights are implicit in the structure of the Constitution, the compact voted upon and accepted by the people as sovereign, rather than merely basing the argument on the fact that these rights exist at common law.
iii. Lack of Express Rights in the Constitution
It is sometimes said that rights should not be implied in the Constitution because the founding fathers, by and large, rejected the need for constitutional protection of rights. Of course, this raises the originalism vs progressivist constitutional debate, and much has been written about this already.
It is submitted that the lack of an express bill of rights in Australia should not (does not) preclude the continued existence of common law rights which cannot be abrogated by Parliament. Such rights existed prior to the creation of the Commonwealth Constitution, under which the federal Parliament directly, and state Parliaments indirectly, derive their power to make laws. Their law-making powers must be read in the light of that history and those prior rights. 176 As Toohey put it:
Just as Parliament must make unambiguous the expression of its legislative will to permit executive infringement of fundamental liberties before the courts will hold that it has done so, it might be considered that the people must make unambiguous the expression of their constitutional will to permit Parliament to enact such laws before the courts will hold that those laws are valid.
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I would respectfully adopt comments by Deane J in Theophanous that the argument that the failure to include an express bill of rights in the Constitution meant there was no intention to protect such rights was 176 'There is an obvious tension between the plenary powers of parliament and the requirements of morality, justice and universal human rights. The Lockean approach resolves this tension by allowing judges to limit parliamentary sovereignty to the extent that it allows infringement of fundamental common law rights, such rights, on the delegation view of the Constitution, having never been ceded to the Parliament in the first place': Wright, above n. 108 at 188-9. See also Brian Fitzgerald, who concludes that 'for too many years Dicey's theory of legal sovereignty residing in the Parliament and political sovereignty existing in the people has been used by those in power to the disadvantage of the ultimate generators of power, the people': 'Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism ' (1993) 'flawed at every step'. 178 The Ninth Amendment merely makes express in the United States what should be implied in Australia.
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Of course, it must be conceded that the founding fathers in Australia considered the option of including an express bill of rights in the Constitution, but decided against it. The relevance of the intentions of the founding fathers to interpretation of constitutional principles today is of course a matter of conjecture. 180 In any event, to the extent that it remains relevant, the founding fathers might have avoided including an express bill of rights because they did not think that Parliament would trample on common law rights, influenced as they were by Diceyan theory. One of them, Cockburn, wondered whether any of the colonies had ever attempted to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process, and was concerned that comments such as 'Pretty things these states of Australia; they have to be prevented by provisions of the Constitution from doing the grossest injustice' 181 would be made by observers. In other words, the founding fathers may not have experienced occasions where Parliament did trample on common law rights, and did not think it would do so. 182 The number of statutes was also much smaller than today.
So, to the extent that the views of the founding fathers are relevant in constitutional interpretation today, it is submitted that their decision not to include an express bill of rights should not lead to the conclusion that statutes might not be declared invalid because they invade fundamental common law liberties or are inconsistent with implied rights.the process will be subjective. 188 Allan refers to the need for a judge implying rights to '[try] not to look as though you are making it up as you go along, of simply reading in your own political and moral preferences'.
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Of course, the precise meaning of 'judicial activism' is a matter of some debate. 190 Further, one can hardly accuse of being radical a principle applied in England more than four centuries ago, and which provided the basis for American legal orthodoxy like Marbury more than two centuries ago. Sir Owen Dixon, who clearly supported the principle in his extra-judicial writings, can hardly be labelled a judicial activist.
Eminent jurists have for centuries recognized that the law should grow and develop through the course of decision-making, 191 to reflect changes in society. As Lord Goff noted:
It is universally recognised that judicial development of the common law is inevitable. If it had never taken place, the common law would be the same now as it was in the reign of King Henry II; it is because of it that the common law is a living system of law, reacting to new events and new ideas, and so capable of providing the citizens of this country with a system of practical justice relevant to the times in which they live.
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So far from being a criticism, the flexibility of the common law is part of its genius and part of the reason it has continued to serve various societies well across several centuries. The judges have a role to play in developing and adapting common law. Labels like 'judicial activism' serve to ignore this role, or seek to downplay the important role that judges play in legal development.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
The notion that Parliament's powers are subject to common law human rights is not new. It was espoused more than four centuries 188 See Winterton, above n. 49 at 143. Winterton says that the content of the supposed fundamental principle and the degree to which it is limited by considerations of reasonableness and proportionality will differ with different judges. While this may be so, the same may be said of existing constitutional principles whereby a Commonwealth law is assessed for validity in terms of whether it is 'a law with respect to' a particular head of power, 'reasonably appropriate and adapted', 'reasonable proportionality' etc. The concept of reasonable regulation appears in the jurisprudence of s. 92 and it is at the heart of the implied free speech cases. Judges differ over the meaning of these concepts and their application in particular cases. With respect, it does not to the writer seem a convincing reason for not accepting the fundamental common law rights argument. 189 See Allan, above n. 168 at 183. 190 ago, both before and after the Glorious Revolution in England. It was adopted with great enthusiasm in the United States, and formed the basis of that country's acceptance of judicial review, a doctrine to which Australia subscribes. One can see in the adoption of an express bill of rights an attempt to express what was already implied-the powers of Parliament were not absolute, and subject to limits involving the rights of citizens. The doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy is a common law principle of relatively recent origin, and is difficult to reconcile with other principles to which we ascribe. It does not fit the reality of Australia's constitutional arrangements, and it is hard to reconcile with developments in the United Kingdom, as some have recognized. Numerous High Court judges have made passing comments to the effect that at least some common law rights are so fundamental that they could not be taken away, including Sir Owen Dixon. These common law rights may be seen to be implicit in the constitutional structure in Australia. It may be that the High Court in Lange was right to say that the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy is no longer helpful in describing Australia's system of governance.
While it is true that the founding fathers did not include an express bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, this was because their experience had not taught them the need to do so. They assumed that Parliaments would not trample upon rights-they did not assume that the common law rights that arrived with the First Fleet were being sacrificed when colonial and then the Commonwealth Parliament was created. In other words, the failure to include express rights should not be taken to mean an intention that the Commonwealth and state Parliaments would have the legislative ability to take away common law rights. There is no evidence that the people intended to give Parliament the power to take away rights, and the rule of law requires that citizens know in advance before power is exercised what the nature and ambit of the power is. If the High Court were to test the validity of legislation against a backdrop of an implicit right to due process enshrined in the Constitution, democracy would not suffer but would be enhanced.
Support for this theory can be found in the work of theorists such as Locke, in terms of the social compact. Locke denied that Parliament would or should be omnicompetent-if citizens banded together, they did so in order to protect rights, rather than create a body with the ability to take them away. A theory that citizens enjoy rights that are above interference by the Parliament is also consistent with the idea that the people enjoy sovereignty, rather than Parliament. Given the theoretical, judicial and extra-judicial support for the idea that at least some human rights are above interference by Parliament, the High Court should now accept this position. I have suggested the kinds of rights to which I am referring. Their meaning and content would of course evolve over the years, as the common law has always done.
